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Summary findings
Bond examines whether trade liberalization should create  infrastructure to neighboring countries than there would
a greater incentive for countries to invest in  be in airport and harbor infrastructure.  The first type of
transportation  infrastructure. He pays special attention  investment is specific to certain markets and is likely to
to the case of preferential trade liberalization between  affect the relative price of goods in those markets. The
neighboring countries, where investments in roads or  second type of investment, on the other hand, will send
railroads are specific to the partner  country and will thus  goods to world markets generally, where prices are likely
have spillover effects. The existence of spillovers will  to be relatively unaffected by the investments.
lead to gains from cooperative agreements about  Bond also examines the desirability of linking regional
investment levels.  trade and infrastructure agreements. The prediction
Bond shows that in a small country the incentive to  generated by his model is that in the absence of
invest in infrastructure depends on the level of the tariff  cooperative agreements between countries, there will be
when demand is linear. If protection is in the form of a  underinvestment in those forms of transportation  in
quota, on the other hand, trade liberalization will  which the investments will have spillover effects to other
increase the optimal infrastructure investment.  countries.
He shows that in a two-country model with spillovers  Bond identifies two forms of gains from infrastructure
between countries, the cooperative equilibrium may  agreements:
involve either more or less investment than the  - Internalizing the terms-of-trade effects and thus
noncooperative equilibrium, depending on the pattern of  avoiding the inefficient investment levels that arise in
trade between the two countries and the degree of  noncooperative choices of investment levels.
substitutability between investments in the two  countries.  - Internalizing the effects of the infrastructure
For a relatively small country, for example, there  investment in the tariff negotiation process, in cases
would be more underinvestment in railroad and highway  where countries cannot commit to future tariff rates.
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As regional trading arrangements  (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added  activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA." This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international  trade policies in an outward-looking fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the international  trade research program
of the Development Research Group of the World Bank. It has produced a number of
methodological innovations in the traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and tackled four new
areas of research: the dynamics of regionalism (e.g., convergence,  growth, investment, industrial
location and migration), deep integration (standards, tax harmonization), regionalism and the rest of
the world (including its effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy
dimensions of regionalism (e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making the Most of Mercosur"  is under way.
Future work is planned on African and Asian regional integration schemes.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
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One of the salient features  of the preferential  trading  arrangements  (PTAs) that have proliferated
in recent years is that the member  countries  tend to be located  in the same geographic  region. The
European  Union,  NAFTA,  and Mercosur, which are among  the most prominent  examples  of PTAs that
have initiated  or expanded  market integration  in recent  years, all consist of countries  that are located  in
the same geographic  region. It has become common  to refer  to countries  that are close in geographic
proximity  as being "natural  trading  partners,"  because  the lower costs of transporting  goods  to nearby
countries  would reduce  the amount  of cost difference  required  to generate  trade between  the countries.'
A common  feature of the models  of natural trading  partners  is that the level of transportation
costs is taken to be exogenously  given,  with transport  costs being lower  between  nearby  countries?
However,  it may in fact be quite costly  to transport  goods  between  two nearby  countries  if the
transportation  infrastructure  between  the countries  is not well developed,  a problem  which is frequently
'The concept  of natural  trading  partners  was first used by Wonnacott  and Lutz (1979),  and has
been popularized  recently  by Krugman  (1991). A somewhat  stronger  statement  is frequently  made,
which is that there is a presumption  that preferential  agreements  between  natural trading partners  are
welfare improving. Frankel,  Stein  and Wei (1995)  provide  a systematic  simulation  analysis  of this issue
in a model  that allows for intra-continental  transport  costs that are lower than inter-continental  transport
costs. They find evidence  that "unnatural"  trading blocs between  countries  on different  continents
typically  reduce welfare, whereas  "natural"  trading  blocs between  countries  in the same  continent  will
raise welfare  if intercontinental  transport  costs are not too low. If intercontinental  transport  costs are very
low, then continental  blocs may also be welfare reducing. It should  be noted that the usefulness  of the
concept  of natural trading partners  to characterize  trading blocs that are welfare-improving  is not without
controversy. Bhagwati  and Panagariya  (1996) argue  that these results are highly  sensitive  to functional
forms, and provide examples  in which it is more desirable  to form a link  with more distant  country.
2Frankel,  Stein,  and Wei (1995))  use a gravity model  to explain  trade patterns  and find evidence
that the volume  of trade between  countries  is negatively  related  to the distance between  them, which is
consistent  with a role for transport  costs. Furthermore,  they include dummy  variables for regional
groupings  as a proxy for the effect  of preferences,  and find some significant  coefficients. In contrast,
Amjadi  and Winters (1997)  construct  a direct measure  of transport  cost from trade data for Mercosur
countries. They find that transport  costs average  approximately  6% of intra-Mercosur  trade for Brazil
and Argentina  and 12%  of trade with the rest of the world (excluding  Chile). They  point out that the
differential  of approximately  6% between  within  bloc and outside  bloc trade is well below the differential
found by Frankel, Stein  and Wei to represent  natural trading  blocs in their simulations.
1encountered  in developing  countries. This has been  particularly  noticeable in the case of the Mercosur
countries,  where cross-border  transportation  links have been  quite poor. For example,  three-quarters  of
the overland  trade between  Brazil and its western  neighbors  travels over a single bridge  over the Uruguay
river.' Also, railway  transport between  Brazil and Argentina  is hampered  by the fact that the respective
countries'  railroads  were built with different  gauges of rail. The formation  of Mercosur  has created
pressure  to expand  the infrastructure  investments  between  the member countries,  as evidenced  by the fact
that Chile's free  trade agreement  with Mercosur  commits  Chile and Argentina  to each spend $150 million
on improving  transportation  infrastructure  (The  Economist  (1996)). Similarly,  the entry of Greece,
Portugal  and Spain into  the European  Union has resulted in substantial  investmnent  in transportation
infrastructure  investment  in these countries. In addition,  an Infrastructure  Committee  was created  as part
of the single  market initiative  to coordinate  transportation  investments  across  countries.
These examples  suggest  that the degree  to which countries  are "natural"  trading partners is to an
important  sense  endogenous. The purpose  of this paper is to examine  the incentives  for investment  in
transport  infrastructure  between  geographically  proximate  countries,  and to examine  how these incentives
are affected  by trade liberalization. A main feature  of this analysis  is to focus  on the fact that transport
investments  between  nearby countries  are frequently  country-specific,  such as roads or railroads,  which
lower transport  costs between  those countries  but have little impact  on transport  costs with the rest of the
world. These  types of infrastructure  investments  differ from investments  in seaports  and airports,  which
typically reduce  transport  costs to many  different  locations. Coordination  of investments  is likely to be
particularly  important  in the former  type of investment,  where the productivity  of investment  by one
country  is likely  to be significantly  affected  by investments  in the other  country  (e.g. adopting  the same
3 The lack of cross-border  transportation  links in South  America  reflects both the difficulties
brought  on by difficult  terrain, such as the Andes,  but also by the historical  mistrust  between  the
countries. Since good  transportation  links are potentially  a route for invading  armies,  countries  tended  to
develop their domestic  transportation  links while  neglecting  connections  with neighboring  countries.
2gauge  of railroad  track). 4 Therefore,  we will examine  how  the level  of investment  is affected  by
coordination  between  the countries,  and whether  coordination  in infrastructure  investments  is enhanced
by preferential  trade liberalization  between  the countries. This question  is important  for policy purposes,
because  it will help to answer whether  cooperative  agreements  on infrastructure  levels  are
complementary  with trade agreements  and should  be tied to preferential  trading  arrangements  or whether
investment  coordination  can be undertaken  independently  of trade liberalization.
Section  11  of the paper analyzes  the optimal  degree of infrastructure  investment  for a small open
economy,  and examines  how the incentives  to invest  in infrastructure  are related  to trade policy in the
absence  of coordination  issues. One's intuition  might suggest  that since trade liberalization  is associated
with an increase in the volume  of trade, the return  to trade-related  infrastructure  investments  should  rise
with the volume  of trade. This intuition  is incorrect  in the case where trade is restricted  by tariffs and the
government  chooses  transport  levels to maximize  national  welfare. In the case where demands  are linear,
the optimal  level of transport  cost investment  is independent  of the level of the tariff because
governments  have an offsetting incentive  to invest  in infrastructure  when tariffs are high in order to
expand  the volume of trade and alleviate  the effects  of the tariff distortion. However,  if trade is restricted
by quotas, infrastructure  investments  will be higher  when trade is liberalized.
Section  III extends  the analysis  to consider  the case of a customs  union between  two countries
that are small  relative  to the rest of the world. It is shown  that the question  of whether  the non-
cooperative  equilibrium  results in underinvestment  relative  to the cooperative  outcome  depends  on the
pattern of trade between  the countries. It is shown  that in a customs union in which  trade continues  with
4A good  example  is provided  by transportation  costs for Uganda, a landlocked  country. A World
Bank (1997)  evaluation  of transportation  cited 8 causes of inefficiency  in the road transport  of imports, 5
of which related  to inefficiencies  in Kenya. These included  a slow weight  bridge  system and convoy
system in Kenya,  lack of properly  operating cranes  at the port of Mombasa,  and slow evaluation  of transit
cargo. Similar  issues arose for rail transport  through Kenya.
3the rest of the world,  the benefits  of transport  cost reduction will not be symmetrically  distributed
between  the countries. The country  experiencing  an improvement  in its terms of trade  will have an
incentive  to overinvest  relative  to the cooperative  level, while  the other  country  will have an incentive  to
under invest. The overall  level of investment  in the non-cooperative  equilibrium  may be higher  or lower
than in the cooperative  equilibrium,  depending  on the degree  of substitutability  between  the investments
by the two countries. In contrast,  in the case where the formation  of the union eliminates  trade with the
rest of the world,  the non-cooperative  equilibrium  will involve  lower levels of investment  by both
countries  than the cooperative  equilibrium. This follows  because  the effects of each country's
infrastructure  investments  spills over to affect the other country  through changes  in the terms of trade. In
each of these cases, the overall benefit  to the union of transport  cost reduction  is independent  of the level
of the tariff when demands  are linear.
Section  IV examines  the linkage  between  trade and infrastructure  investments  between  nearby
countries. It is shown  that there is a basic independence  between  trade and infrastructure  agreements
when demands  are linear, because  the efficient level of one variable  (tariff levels  or investments)  is
independent  of the level of the other  variable. It is also shown  that when negotiations  over tariff rates
take place after infrastructure  investrnents  have been made, countries  will use investmnents  strategically  to
influence  tariff negotiations.  Infrastructure  agreements  can be used to internalize  these effects,  which
leads  to efficient  choices of infrastructure.  This represents  a second form of benefit from cooperative
infrastructure  investments. Section  V offers some concluding  remarks  on the relationship  between
infrastructure  investments  and other forms of public goods  in customs  unions  that have  been studied.
I.  Infrastructure  Investments  in a Small  Country
In this section  we examine  how the benefits of reductions  in transport  costs are related  to the
level of tariffs and the volume of trade for a small country. We analyze  a simple  partial  equilibrium
4model in which there  are two traded  goods,  with the numbering  of goods  chosen such  that good 1(2)  is
the home country  import  (export). 5 We begin  by deriving  the effect of reductions  in transport  costs on
national  welfare. These  results are then used to derive  the optimal  level of infrastructure  investment,  and
to examine  how the optimal  investment  level is affected  by trade liberalization.
The home country  import  demand schedule  is denote M,(p,)  and the export  supply schedule  is
X2(p 2), where pi is the domestic  price of good i in the home  country. Units are chosen such  that the
transport  cost per unit of each good is v. Letting  t (t2') be the home  (foreign)  tariff per unit  of imports  of
good 1 (2) and p,*  the domestic  price  of good i in the foreign  country,  commodity  arbitrage  ensures
pi =pi +t 1 +v and P2 = p2 -t 2 -v.  Foreign  prices pi' are exogenously  given by the small  country
assumption. Welfare  for the home  country  can be expressed  as the sum of tariff revenue  and consumer
and producer  surplus in each market,
P2
W(t 1,v)  =  fM (u)du  + fX2(U)du + t1MI(p 1)  (1)
p 1 0
Differentiating  (1) yields
aW  =_tM  II>  0;  aW  =  M(p1)  +  X(p2)  - tIMI/ >  0  (2)
5The  partial  equilibrium  model is chosen  to simplify  two aspects  of the problem:  the existence  of
income effects in demand  and the effect of infrastructure  investments  on the outputs of the two goods.
This partial  equilibrium  model  can be interpreted  as a general equilibrium  model in which there is a
traded good 0 with zero  tariffs and transport  costs. The production  side is assumed  to have  goods 1 and 2
produced  using sector-specific  capital  and mobile labor,  while good 0 and transport  infrastructure
investments  require only labor. With this production  structure,  changes  in infrastructure  investmnent  will
change  only output  of good 0, and not that of 1 or 2. Preferences  for the goods  are assumed  to be
represented  by a utility function  U,(D,) + U2(D 2) + Do,  where Di  denotes  consumption  of good i and U;  is
a strictly concave function, so that all income  effects are absorbed  by good 0. The absence  of income
effects allows good 0 to be used to make transfers between  countries  for the case of a customs union
considered  later.
5A tariff reduction  must be welfare-increasing  for a small  open economy  when  4 > 0. When  domestic
price is above world price,  the increase in trade volume  created by a tariff reduction is welfare  increasing.
A reduction  in transport  costs has two favorable  effects on welfare:  (i) it improves  the terms of trade for
the small importing  country  by reducing  the costs of imports  and raising  the return per unit of exports (at
given prices in the rest of the world)  and (ii) it has a favorable  effect on the volume  of imports.  The
favorable  terms of trade effect is proportional  to the volume  of trade, indicating  that reductions  in
transport  costs are more beneficial  when  the volume of trade with the rest of the world is large.
A. Optimal Transportation  Infrastructure  in the Small  Country  Case
Now suppose  that domestic  resources  can be devoted  to investments  in infrastructure  that reduce
transport  costs. These investments  could include  projects  to upgrade  roads and railroads,  port facilities,
and airports. Our analysis  will focus on the case in which these investments  are public  goods, so it is
natural to think of the government  as making  the decisions  on the level of investment  to undertake. We
will treat this as a two period model,  with r denoting  the amount  of investment  in transport  cost reduction
made in the first period.  The level of unit transport  costs in the second  period is v = ¢(r), where ¢' <0,
*)"  > 0 reflects increasing  marginal  infrastructure  costs of reducing  unit transport  costs. The present
value of second  period welfare  for the country,  given  an investment  of r in the first period,  is PW(t,
¢(r)), where ,B  is the discount  factor on second  period  payoffs. Note that the second  period here should
be interpreted  as being  the life of the investment. 6
If the choice of transportation  infrastructure  is being made by the government, then r will be
6 For example,  if the project is completed  in one year and has a life of T years, then
p =  S  ( i  )  when i is the market  rate of interest. The assumption  of separability  between  transport
investments  and period  0 outputs of goods 1 and 2 (see footnote  6 ) thus implies  no distorting  effect of the
investment  on period 0 trade flows.
6chosen to maximize  net national  welfare, ,BW(t,,  4  (r)) -r. The optimal level  of investment  in transport
costs occurs  where
Ml(P 1)  +  X2(p2)  - t1M'  =  - 10(r)  (3)
which requires  equating  the marginal  social  benefit of transport  reduction  to the marginal  cost?
If the tariff level is being set to maximize  national  welfare,  then the tariff will be zero
independently  of the level of transport  costs. However,  suppose  that the government  is constrained in its
ability to change  tariff levels, so that the level of the tariff is viewed  as exogenously  given  by the
government. We could then consider  a second  best exercise  of examining  the optimal  level of r given  the
tariff, in order establish  how the incentive  to invest  in infrastructure  varies  with the level of the tariff.
Totally  differentiating  (3) yields
ar  - tM //4
aV~  2 (¢)+ 
There are two offsetting  effects of an increase  in the tariff rate on the optimal level of transport
cost reduction. The first is that an increase  in the tariff reduces  the volume  of trade,  which reduces  the
cost-savings  resulting  from an increase in r. The second  is that a higher  tariff raises the distortion  on
imports,  which raises the amount of tariff revenue  gained  by a reduction  in transport  costs. In the case of
a linear demand  curve,  these two effects  exactly  offset (i.e. the numerator  in (4) is 0) and the tariff has no
7Tle sufficient  condition  for a maximum  is that (a2W/8v  2)(+4)2  aw-aW/&)4<o  . From (3) it can
be seen that  2W  IV
2 >  0 as long as the home import  demand  schedule  is not too concave  in pA.  Since
benefits  depend  on the volume  of trade and the volume  of trade rises as transport  costs fall, this creates a
tendency  toward increasing  marginal  benefits  of transport  cost reduction. Therefore,  satisfaction  of this
condition  requires  that 4)  be sufficiently  convex. An interior solution  with r > 0 and v > 0 can be
guaranteed  by assuming lim  r-O ¢'(r) =  - co and that lim  r-.  +(r) > 0.
7effect on the optimal  r. If the home  import demand  curve for imports  is convex  (concave)  in p, then an
increase  in t, will increase  (decrease)  the optimal  r.  A convex  import demand  schedule  has a smaller
trade volume  effect  when the tariff is high, which raises the benefits  of transport  cost reduction.
The analysis  in this section  has been made under  the assumption  of a specific  tariff to simplify
the presentation. This result  will also hold in the case of an ad valorem  tariff as long as the tariff is
imposed  on the fob price of the import.  Letting  r, ('2  )  denote the ad valorem import  tariff imposed  in
the home (foreign) country, home country prices will be p,  =  v +p *(I +t1 )  and P 2 = (p*  -v)/(1 +t2)  and
the benefit  of transport  cost reduction will be  -aW/av  = M(p1)+X(p 2)-t1pM1
1. This yields
a3W/arav = 0 when the import  demand  curve is linear,  so the level of transport  cost investment  will be
independent  of the tariff rate when demand  is linear!
B. Quantitative  Restrictions
The effect of trade liberalization  on the benefits  of transport  cost reduction  will differ  when
protection  is by quotas,  however,  because  there is no trade volume  effect of transport  cost reduction  with
quantitative  restrictions. With an import  quota set at Q  I, the domestic  price of the importable  is
determined  by the market-clearing  condition  M, (Pi )  =  Q1 . Assuming  that the rents from the quota
accumulate  to home country  residents,  home welfare  will be
P2
W(Q 1,v)  =  fM ,(u)du + fx2cu  +  (pl -pI*)Q.  The  benefit  of transport cost reduction in this case is
W(Q  If the tariffd  is  wXd  Pl  Q.Te  haenef-s
PI 
If theatariffisimposed  on the c.i.f. price, we havep  = (v  + p,)(l +)'  P 2 =  (P2 /  2  +t  )-v,
and  -aW/a  v =  M(p )  + X(p2)  - xI,  +  X)(v+p;)MI/ With linear demand,
_  a2W/OvaT,  = -2(pl  +v)-t 1 M  > O. When  the tariffis imposed  on the transportation  cost component  of
the price, an increase in the tariff raises rate makes  the benefits  of transport  cost reduction  larger because
the trade volume  effect is larger. It then follows  that the optimal  infrastructure  investment  will be
increasing  in the tariff rate with linear demand.
8simply  the reduction  in the cost of trade,
- 8W(Q1 v)  =  Ql  + X(P 2)  > o  (5)
The difference  between  (5) and (2) is that with a quota in place, a reduction in transport  costs  will not
increase  the volume of trade. The optimal  level of r in the presence  of a quota will be determined  by the
condition  '  =  ,v.  This yields  two results on the differences  between  optimal  transport  cost
ov  ''01'
investments  under quotas  and those under tariffs. First, the level of transport  investment  will be greater
under a tariff than under  the equivalent  quota,  because  the tariff creates an additional  benefit of transport
cost reduction due to the impact  on trade volume?  Second,  an expansion  of the quota must result in an
increase  in the optimal  level of r, regardless  of the shape of the import  demand  schedule. Thus, trade
liberalization  should  result in an incentive  to increase  the amount  of investment  in transportation
infrastructure.
Note that the level  of infrastructure  investment  chosen with the quota is the same level that would
be chosen if protection  was provided  by tariffs and the infrastructure  investment  were being  made by the
private sector  with projects  being evaluated  at domestic  (rather than world)  prices. It is also the level of
investment  which minimizes  the present value of transport-related  costs for a given  trade volume,
P40(rXM 1+X 2) + r, which includes  both infrastructure  costs and unit costs.
The results of this section for the small country  case can be summarized  in the following  result:
Proposition  1: For a small country,
(a) The optimal  level of infrastructure  investment  exceeds that which  minimizes  transport  costs (for the
9Note that with endogenous  transportation  costs,  the equivalent  tariff for a quota  of Q 1 is
determined  by the condition  MI(p  ; +O(F(tl))+tl)  =  Q,  where i(tl) is the optimal  level of investment  for
the tariff t,.
9given trade volume)  in the  presence of a positive tariff (either  specific  or ad valorem  tarif/)
because  of the  favorable trade volume  effects  of transport  cost reductions.
(b) If demand  is linear, the optimal  level of transport  cost investment  will be independent  of the level  of
a specific tariff or an ad valorem  tariff imposed  on the  f o.b.  price.
(c) If imports  are restricted  by quotas,  the optimal  level of investment  is the one that minimizes
transport  costs. Investment  will increase  with quota liberalization  in all cases.
These  results will serve as a useful  benchmark,  because  they yield the linkage between  trade policy  and
infrastructure  in the absence  of spillovers  between  countries.
III. Infrastructure  Investment  in a Customs  Union
In this section  we analyze  the case in which there are two small  countries,  A and B, trading with
the rest of the world. Countries  A and B are assumed  to be located  next  to each other, so that
infrastructure  investments  in one country  have an effect on the productivity  of investments  in the other.
In this section  we will analyze  the effect of cooperative  infrastructure  agreements  between  the two
countries  by comparing  the investment  levels that arise  when the countries  behave non-cooperatively.  In
particular,  we will examine  how this comparison  depends  on the pattern of trade between  the two
countries  and on the existence  of a preferential  trading  arrangement  between  the two countries.
We analyze  a two good model,  as in the small  country  case, with the pattern of comparative
advantage  will be chosen  such that country  A (B) imports 1 (2) and exports good 2 (1) at the initial  world
prices and tariff rates. The rest of the world, denoted  by *, assumed  to be sufficiently  large  that world
prices  Pl' and P2*  are unaffected  by trade of either A or B. The transport  costs between  countries  A and B
are v per unit for either product,  while  transport  costs between  the rest of the world and either country  are
v'.  to' denotes  the tariff imposed  by country  i on imports  of good k from country  j, where i, j = A, B, *,i
* j; k = 1,2,  and pki  is the internal  price of good k in country  i.  It will be assumed  that in the initial
10A  t,  A2
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Figure  la  Case I: Country A Imports 1 from B and * and Exports 2 to B and *A  t  A*  +v
t  AB +v
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Figure  lb: Case II: Preferential Tariff Reductions Eliminate Trade with *situation  with non-discriminatory  tariffs  (i.e. ;AB =  t,A'* and  t 2BA  =  2B*)  country  A imports  good I from
both B and * and exports good 2 to both B and *.  Figure la illustrates  the initial trade pattern,  with the
costs of moving  goods (transport  costs  plus import  tariffs) between  the markets indicated  next to the
respective  arrows.'°
The transportation  cost assumptions  in this section  are intended  to capture  the returns  to transport
cost investments  that are specific  to trade between  A and B, and have no effect on the cost of trading with
the rest of the world. One might interpret  these as being overland  transportation  routes between  A and B,
such as railroads  or roads, which serve to move goods  only between  the two countries. Specifically,  unit
transport costs between countries A and B are v = 4)(rA,  rB  ), where ?i  is the investment of country i in
infrastructure.  It is assumed  that the transport  costs are decreasing  in each country's  investment  level,
(k,i  < 0, and that 4)  is convex in (rl, rB  ). The cross effect  captures  the substitutability/
complementarity  between  infrastructure  investments  in the two countries. Investments  in the two
countries will be substitutes (complements ) if 4,  A  B  >  (<) 0, because an increase in the level of country
B investment  reduces  (raises) the cost reduction  generated  by country  A investment.  Investment in the
two countries  might be substitutes  in the case of investment  in a bridge over a river on the border between
two countries,  where the investment  in the bridge  could  be made by either country. The case of perfect
substitutability  would arise if the quality  of the bridge depends  only on the sum of expenditures  by the
two countries  in constructing  the bridge. Complementarity,  on the other  hand, case  might arise in the
case of a road connecting  the two countries,  with each country  investing  in the section  of the road that lies
within its borders. If the size of trucks that can  be run along the road (and hence the level of unit
transport  costs) is determined  by the lowest  quality section  of the road, then  we have the case of perfect
'  Letting  ql denote  the autarky  price in country  i, the assumption  on comparative  advantage  is
that q,A  < qi for i oA. The initial trade pattern illustrated  in Figure la implies  the following  restrictions
on tariffs and transport  costs: (i) A will import  good 1 from B and * if q  A >  q,i +  vi +t,Ai  for i  = B, *.
(ii) B will export  to A (rather  than *) if v + tAB<  2vs  +t 2*A +
11complementarity, with v =  4( min (r, r*  )).  Transport costs between either country and the rest of the
world will be an exogenously given at V.  These transport cost links can be thought of as seaports or
airports, which are not specific to transport costs with a particular country and are thus less subject to
coordination problems in investment level.
Reductions in transport costs or preferential trade liberalization between A and B will lead to an
increase in the volume of trade between A and B.  Two cases will be considered in the analysis below.
In case I, shown in Figure  I  a, country A continues to trade goods 1 and 2 with the rest of the world after
the fornation  of the union.  The linkage between prices in the two countries is then given by the
following relationship:
Casel:  A  =  *;+ +A*  B  AB;  A  *  *  BA
Case  I:  pi  1 v  +t 1 = pI  + v  +  t  ;  p2 p=  -v  -tA  =  p2 _  BA  (6)
In case I  prices in country A and the domestic price of B's importable are determined by the exogenously
given prices in the foreign country, while country B's export price is determined by trade/transport
barriers between A and B.  In case II, the supply of good 2 and demand for good 1 in country B are
sufficiently large that a preferential tariff reduction results in the elimination of trade between the union
and the outside world.  Prices in A and B are thus given by
Case  II:  PA  PB  +  v  +  t AB  *  A*  A  B  - v  - t  BA  >  p  *  -V  BAA  *A
In case II, domestic prices in both countries are endogenously determined as in the case of two large
countries.
In this section we will emphasize two types of spillovers that occur between the member
countries of the customs union as a result of infrastructure investments.  The first spillover is the impact
of investments by one country on the level of transport costs and the profitability of investments for the
other country as captured by the 4(rA,  rB)  function.  The second spillover is the impact of transport costs
12on the terms of trade between the two union members.  The trade pattems illustrated in Figure 1 are not
intended to be exhaustive, but are chosen to illustrate two quite different implications for the distribution
of terms of trade effects between the two countries.  In case I, A's terms of trade are locked in to the
world market and all of the effects of changes in transport costs will be reflected in changes in B's
domestic prices.  In case II, the reductions will be distributed more symmetrically across countries, with
prices in both countries changing as a result of reductions in transport costs.  We will show that in the
former case the gains are captured exclusively by country B and the non-cooperative infrastructure level
may be either higher or lower than the cooperative level.  In the former case, in contrast, both countries
experience the benefits of one country's infrastructure investment.  This leads to a prisoner's dilemma in
which the non-cooperative level will be less than the cooperative level.
A. Case I: Customs Union with Trade with the Foreign Country
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where the domestic prices are determined by (6).  Domestic prices in A will be unaffected by changes in
either tariffs or transport costs, but for country B we have dp,B  = -dv - dtl'  and dp 2B = dv + dt 2BA.  The
effects of transport cost and tariff reductions on A's welfare, assuming 11AB  < t1A*, are given by
aW  =  - B  AB  _  At)XB  <0°  aW  (t  AB  A  t*)X,B  ￿0  (9)
AB3av
13A preferential tariff reduction by A has two negative effects on A: it worsens the terms of trade by
increasing the price of imports from B and it also diverts trade from the lower cost non-member country
when t1AB < t,A  . A transport cost reduction also has a negative effect for A when 1,AB  < t 1 A  because of the
expansion of trade with the partner country.
For country B, welfare effects are
CWB  B  'W  BA  B'  a  AB
AW  B  xi  >aw;  - =  _ t 2 MA 2 >  0;  =X  +  M2 _ t2 M2  > 0(10)
BA-I ati  al2 
The preferential tariff reduction by A raises B's welfare because it improves B's terns  of trade, and a
preferential reduction by B raises B's welfare because it has a favorable effect on trade volume.  B also
benefits from a reduction in transport costs.  Note the similarity of the effect of reductions in 1BA and v
for country B and those obtained in the small country case.
In the case where countries choose infrastructure investment levels non-cooperatively, country i
will choose i to maximize W(tAB, t2aA, 4,(rA,  rB))  - r,  given rJ (i, j = A, B and i #  j).  Since A experiences
a welfare reduction from infrastructure investments, IA  = 0.  B will choose its level of infrastructure
investment such that  the marginal benefit of transport cost reductions equals the marginal cost,
XiB +  M B  t BAM B'/  1  (11)
+ - t2 M2 I3~Pdr,(O,r  B)  (1
The non-cooperative investment level can be contrasted with the level undertaken if the two countries
behave cooperatively, which would arise if countries are able to write a binding contract that  specifies
the investment levels of the two countries.  Assuming that it is possible to make transfers between
countries, the cooperative level would involve choosing IA  and r'  to maximize WA + WB. This yields the
necessary condition for optimal choice of investment
14B  B  BA  '  AB  A*X  B' 
xi  + M 2 _-t2 M2 + (tl  -t 1 ) 1 =  _12_  -____
X  B4A  A(r A r  B)  Pf  B(r  Ar  B)  (12)
(12) requires  that the marginal  benefit  of transport  cost reduction  to the union as a whole equal  the
marginal  cost of transport  cost reduction  in each location.
( 11) and (12) can be used  to compare  the level of cost reduction in the non-cooperative
equilibrium  investment  in the non-cooperative  equilibrium  with that in the cooperative  equilibrium,  which
is shown in Figure 2. The MBB curve in Figure 2 is the marginal  benefit to B of transport  cost reductions
(the left hand side of (11)) which will be upward  sloping  for the case of linear demand. The MCL(O)
curve is the marginal  cost of reducing  v for country  B when r4= 0. The equilibrium  investment  level for
the non-cooperative  case, vN,  is determined  by the intersection  of the MB' and MCB(0)  curves,  with the
second order condition requiring  that MCO  be steeper  at the intersection. The MBU  curve is the marginal
benefit to the union as a whole of transport  cost reductions,  which  will lie below the MHP  locus for t,A'  <
t,A*.  The MCU  curve is the marginal  cost of transport  cost reduction  for the union when  eA  and r" are
chosen to minimize the cost of achieving  a given  v, which  requires MC, =  - [3rB(r  A  r B)]-1 =
- |<| A(r  A,r  B)- 11.  It can be shown  that a sufficient  condition  for the MCu  curve  to lie below  the MC'(O)
curve is that rI be a "normal"  input,  in the sense  that the cost-minimizing  choice of 1 e  is an increasing
function  of the overall level of infrastructure  investment  (i.e. a lower level of v)!'  The level of unit
transport  costs for the cooperative  case, v", is determined  by the intersection  of the MCI and MBU
curves.
Figure 2 illustrates  that both the marginal  benefit and the marginal  cost of transport  cost
Totally differentiating  -[(i)  (r  r'1  subject  to  dv =  Bdr  B  +  4  Adr  A  =  0, we obtain the
r tthat  [t4)r(r  Ar  B)]1  is  decrsing  in r4 ff 4)  Br B
4
l  A  - kr Br  A
4 r  <0.  It is straightforward to show
that this condition is satis'fied if the solutions {iA(v,  a), r(v,  a)} to the problem:
min arA + r'  subject  to  4 (r 1A  r')  2  v
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Figure 2 Comparison of Transport Cost levels in the Non-Cooperative Case (VI) and the Cooperative
Case (vc)reductions  are higher  in the non-cooperative  case. Two examples  can be used to illustrate  that VI  may be
either greater  or less than  vl.  First, suppose  that investments  by A and B are perfect substitutes,  with v =
4p(r'  + rB). In this case MCB(O)  = MCU  and the investment  by B in the non-cooperative  equilibrium  must
exceed  that in the cooperative  equilibrium  as long as 11AB  < t 1 A*.  If the investments  are perfect
complements,  on the other hand, then r`= r' = 0 in the non-cooperative  equilibrium. Since  A does not
invest,  the marginal  cost of reducing  v is arbitrarily  high in B and no investment  will take place. In this
case,  the cooperative  equilibrium  must lead  to higher  investment  than in the cooperative  equilibrium.
Conditions  (11) and (12) can also be used to identify  the effect of preferential  trade liberalization
on the benefits  of transport  cost reduction. For B, the effect of a reduction  in  "BA  is identical  to that for
the small country  case,  which means  that diB/dt 2BA  = 0 when demands  are linear. However,  a reduction
in country  A's tariff will raise the return  to infrastructure  investment  by country  B, because it expands  the
volume of exports  of good 1, aw  B/8vItBA =  -XIB  < 0.  Note however  that for country  A we have
8,W  A/8Vat  BA=  X  8  +(t  AB  _  t A #)X  B ".  Summing  these  two terms, it can be seen that there is no effect
of trade liberalization  on optimal  investments  for the union as a whole when  demand  and supply curves
are linear.
These  results can be summarized  as:
Proposition  2: (a) In the non-cooperative  equilibrium  for infrastructure  investments  in case I, the country
(A) whose  internal  prices remain constant  will make  no infrastructure  investments. The country  whose
terms  of trade improve (B) earns  a higher marginal  benefitfrom infrastructure  benefit  than  for the union
as a whole  when it has  preferential  access to the  partner's market. The level of unit  transport  costs in the
cooperative  equilibrium  may be higher or lower than in the non-cooperative  equilibrium.
(b) Trade  liberalization  has no effect on the incentives  to investfor the union as a whole when
demand/supply  curves are linear, but will increase  the transport  cost investment  of B in the non-
cooperative  equilibrium.
16This suggests  that when the trade pattern  takes this form, there is no reason  to tie cooperative  agreements
on transport  costs to trade liberalization  agreements.
B. Case II: Customs  Union  with No Trade with Non-members
We next consider  Case II, where the preferential  tariff reduction  eliminates  trade with the foreign
country. Note that this is an example  of the cases discussed  by Wonnacott  and Wonnacott  (1981) in
which a customs  union can achieve  gains that cannot  be obtained  from unilateral  liberalization,  due to the
endogeneity  of the terms of trade for each country. When  two large countries  are negotiating  tariff
reductions,  individual  countries  will not have an incentive  to unilaterally  reduce  their tariffs from the
Nash equilibrium  level because  the benefits of tariff reduction  spill over to affect the other country. This
creates a prisoner's  dilemma,  which requires  simultaneous  trade liberalization  by the two countries. In
this section  we show that a similar prisoner's  dilemma  will arise  with regard to infrastructure  investments,
because  countries  fail to internalize  the full effects of transport  cost reductions  on the other  country. In
this case,  the investment  levels in the non-cooperative  equilibrium  will be too low.
Using  (7), the prices in country  B can be determined  by the market-clearing  conditions  in the
respective  markets,  M A(p  +tAB +v)  =  X B(p,  )and M2B(p2B)  =  X  2A(p2 t BA -v),  where X B (M 2B)  iS
B's export  supply  (import  demand)  function. Differentiating  these conditions  yields
~B  -l  1B  IA
aAB  OaV  M  A  -X  B/
(13)
1,42  B  42  B  X2  ,A/ I1>  > 0
2BA  aV  M  B-X  A/
- 2 2
The impact  on B market prices  is greater in absolute  value the less elastic  are the B demand/supply
schedules  relative  to those of country  A.
17Since all trade is between  A and B in this case, the welfare expressions  for the respective
countries  are  p2A
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Using (7) and the market  clearing  prices  p 1 (tI,Alv)  and p2(t 2 B  A,v) in (13), we obtain  the effect of
reductions  in transport  costs to be welfare  to be
--  aWA=  Ml(Pl  )( 1 +  )  +  X2 (P2 A)(  1--$)  - AML|(l  +-)  >  O
av  I  a  v  I  I  a
(15)
aW  B  - - I B  B  BP  BA  B/aP2 =  _  Xl (P )_  + M 2 (P  2 )  .. 5.>  - AM2  0
av  av  av  a
A reduction  in transport  costs must raise A's welfare,  just as it did in the small country  case. However,  A
does not obtain the full benefit  of transportation  cost investments  it undertakes  because  part of the
benefits spill over to B through changes  in the terms of trade. A similar spillover  is associated  with
ap
investments  by B. The gain  to A (B) is smaller (larger)  the greater is the impact  on B prices,
The necessary  condition  for optimal  choice of infrastructure  investment  in the non-cooperative
case, where each country  chooses its level of investment  to maximize  its national  welfare  taking the
policy of the other country  as given,  will be
aw  it,  tAB2 A  (B A,r B))  i=A,B  (16)
aV  ~  ~~~~~~~~  =¢(  AA  r  B6) a18A,  B)
18(16) defines the reaction function for country i, it = *i(r, tlB, tBA). The Nash equilibrium values for
infrastructure  investment  are the values {rAN,  rBN}such  that (16) is satisfied  for both countries.
We can now use (15) and (16) to establish  the following  result:
Proposition  3: (a) If demands  are linear  and 4r t,<  0, then infrastructure  investments  in A and B are
strategic  complements  (i.e. ai/ar  i > 0).
(b) In the non-cooperative  equilibrium  in infrastructure  investments  in Case  II, where trade with
the rest of the world has been  eliminated,  the welfare of both countries  can be increased  by a
simultaneous  increase  in investment  levels in both countries.
Proof: (a) The second  order condition  for choice of i  requires (a2W/Iv 2)(Q, )2 +(aW/av)4r  ,<O  .
Therefore, adp/ar  J > 0 iff (a2W/aV 2)Oi,,0rj + (aW/av)d)r j > 0.  It can be established from (2) that
aWiav  < 0 and a8wIav 2 > 0 if the demand supply  schedules  are linear.  Since 4,y,  r <0,  it follows
that  *r  <  o is sufficient  for HH to be upward sloping.
(b) Let W ;(rj)  = max  W i(t AB tBA+, 4 (r A r B))  - r i.  It follows from (15) and (16) that
a* iar  j = (aw  i1av)4,j  > 0. O
Figure 3 illustrates  Proposition  3 for the case where  +, Ar  B < 0.  By part a of the Proposition,  the
reaction  functions  of each country  will be upward sloping in this case,  with the locus  AA (BB) denoting
the reaction  function  of country  A (B). The WN  contour  represents  the welfare level for country i in the
Nash equilibrium,  which  will be horizontal  (vertical)  at the intersection  point for country  A (B). Part b of
the Proposition  reflects the fact that the values of (rA,  rB)  that improve  welfare of both countries  lie in the
lens created  by the respective  iso-welfare  contours  of the two countries. This underinvestment  result
does not depend  on the sign of 4j,Ar  , because  it will continue  to hold when  the reaction  functions  are
downward  sloping. The  results of this case contrast  with those in case I, where a general
underinvestment  result  was not available  because  of the fact that aW A/ar  B = (aW  A/aV)4,O  < 0 by (9).






Figure 3: Nash Equilibrium  for Infrastructure  Investmnents  in Case IIexhibited  underinvestment  or overinvestment  in the examples in case  I.
The efficient  investment  level is the one that maximizes  the sum of the welfare levels of the two
countries. Using (16), the necessary  condition  for optimal  investmnent  in the cooperative  case is
M  + X 2 - ti  M  I  {-)  t2  M2 B(-j  =  -(1  (17
1  2  av  2  av~~~~~~~~~i()  A(r  AsrB  Zesr  A r B)
The  cooperative  investment  levels  will internalize  the effects of each country's  investment  on the other's
welfare level.
These  results can be used to obtain  the relationship  between  trade liberalization  and the returns  to
infrastructure  in each country. We will establish  the following  result for the large country  case:
Proposition  4: If import  demand  and export  supply curves are linear,  then
(a) the benefit  of infrastructure  investment  is increasing  in the country's  own tariff,  _- C
&W  > o, and decreasing in the other country's tariff,  - a2W  A  _<  W  < O.
at  BA  OV-I~BA  aV&tIAB
(b) the optimal  infrastructure  investmentfor  the union as a whole is independent  of either country's
tariff
Proof: To establish  (a), we differentiate  (15) to obtain
,@2  A  ap  A  n,B  (A  2  a2  B  a2p  ^A
a  A  M1 A,  r1P  I  j  1m  + Ml  P  -t1AB  ml
aV& AB  AIV  a  AB  va&t  AB  aVat  AB 1  1  avat
(18)
a2W B  X BIaPi  ap,  _  B  a  I
aVati AB  I  aV  &IAB  aVat AB)
20In the case where demand/supply  curves are linear,  a2piB/avat,AB = a2p IA/avat1AB = 0 by (13) and only
the first term in each expression  will be non-zero. Since  ap lAv  < 0 and apiB/atIAB  =  ap  8,av  >  0, we
obtain - 2W  A/Vt  AB > 0 and -a'w  R/votAR  < 0 for the linear case. A similar argument  for changes
in t2BA  establishes  part a of the Proposition. To establish  b, note that we can use (13) to show that
Ml (ap  A/av)  =  Ml  A(,  (ap  1Bav)) =  X  B(ap  Blav).  It then follows  that  - alW A/V&Ill  +
-a2W  B,a&ABt  =  0.11
In the small country  case,  the impact  of a tariff on the volume  of trade exactly  offsets  the impact
of the tariff on the distortion  on imports  when demands  are linear. Proposition  4 shows  that a similar
result  holds for the large country  case, in that the sum of trade volume effects  across  the two countries
equals  the impact  on the tariff distortion  when the tariff is increased. This results in no impact  of a tariff
change on the incentive to invest in infrastructure at the union level!2 However, the fact that the trade
volume  effect is shared between  the two countries  due to changes  in the terms  of trade means  that the
tariff will alter the incentive  of the individual  countries  to invest in infrastructure.
It should  be noted  that this conclusion  will not necessarily  hold when  countries  are adopting  a
criterion  that is other than one of maximizing  national  welfare.  Suppose  that the level of infrastructure
investment  is being chosen to minimize the cost of transportation expenditures,  f31QA,  rB)(M,A  + MIB)  +
r' + rB,  given  the level of trade. The necessary  condition  for optimal  infrastructure  investment  in this case
would be
ml  A(pIA) +  M  2B(p 2B)=  - 19-
M+  (,)(r  A,r  B)  P,4is(r Ar  )  (19)
12Note  that an additional  implication  of the result  that - a2W  A/NvA"  +  -82W BlavatIAB =  0 is
that the benefit  of tariff reduction  is independent  of the level of transportation  cost. Thus,  trade
agreements  with nearby  countries  are not more attractive  than agreements  with distant  countries  when
demand  is linear in this model.
21Note that this necessary  condition  would  arise if trade restrictions  are in the form of country-specific
quotas,  as in (5) for the small open economy  case, or if effects  on tariff revenues  are being  ignored.
Since  the volume  of trade increases  when trade is liberalized,  trade liberalization  will result in an increase
in the returns to infrastructure  investment  and typically  to a reduction  in unit transport  cost in the
cooperative  equilibrium.
IV. Tying  Together  Infrastructure  Agreements  and Preferential  Trading  Arrangements
The  analysis  so far has concentrated  on optimal  choice of infrastructure,  under  either a
cooperative  or non-cooperative  choice of investments  by the two countries,  treating  the tariff as
exogenously  chosen. We conclude  by discussing  the implications  of these results for an environment  in
which countries  have  the option  of negotiating  both tariff rate reductions  and infrastructure  investments
as part of their preferential  trade arrangement. We will analyze  two cases:  one in which countries
simultaneously  choose  infrastructure  levels and tariff rates, and one in which infrastructure  investments
are made in the first period  and tariff rates are chosen in the second  period. The second  case is intended
to capture  the notion  that once  transport  cost investments  have been sunk,  they may influence  subsequent
trade negotiations  between  the countries.
We begin  with the case in which the countries  can write a contract in the first period that commits
them to infrastructure  investments  and second  period  tariff rates. If we assume  that lump  sum transfers
are possible  between  countries,  then the values {t  B,'tBA,,rB}  will be chosen to maximize  the sum of
payoffs  to the union as a whole. The countries  will then bargain  over lump sum  transfers  that determine
the split of the union  payoff between  the two countries. The sum of payoffs  to the union as a whole is
denoted V U(t  AB  t2BA  tA*,r  A, r B) =  pw i(tiAB  t2B  ,  ,(r  A,r 5))-r  . The  efficient  trade and
i=A,B
infrastructure  agreement  is defined  to be the one that maximizes  union welfare,
{ABj  BA'i  A  i  AB  BA  A  A,B)
ji  st2  , r  ,r  }=  argmax V U(t  ,t 2 ,t  Ir  Ar  (20)
22First consider the case 1, where A's domestic prices are equal to those of the rest of the world.  By
summing the benefits of countries A and B from (9) and (10), it can be seen that the optimal policy is
AB  =  t1A  and  BA =  0. Greater benefits  (for the union as a whole) can be achieved by a unilateral cut in
B's external tariff than by a customs union, because the preferential reduction by A leads to an inefficient
diversion of trade from the rest of the world.  Welfare can be increased further if A unilaterally reduces
its external tariff so that tA'  =  0.  In case II we have a situation with two large countries, so the negotiated
tariff reduction that maximizes the sum of their welfare is  AB  =  t2 A=  0.  The values of optimal
infrastructure investments for case I [II] is then given by (12) [(17)] evaluated at the optimal tariffs.
Note that in either case, the efficient trade agreement between the two countries is independent of
the level of transport costs between the two countries.  Thus, the level of tariffs that is chosen by the
simultaneous negotiation over tariffs and infrastructure is the same as the one that would be obtained
when only tariffs are being negotiated.  Similarly, Propositions 2b and 4b established that in the case
where demand curves are linear, the infrastructure investment levels obtained in a cooperative agreement
will be independent of the level of tariff rates negotiated between the two countries.  Combining these
results yields an independence between efficient trade agreements and infrastructure agreements in the
linear case, since the value chosen in either efficient agreement for the union would be independent of the
levels chosen in the other agreement.  In particular, there would be no incentive for a country to sign a
trade agreement that is inefficient (e.g. an agreement that gives B preferential access to A's market in case
I) with a cooperative infrastructure agreement, because there are no spillovers of the trade agreement to
the infrastructure agreement.
It should be noted however that the fact that the efficient trade agreements are independent of the
level of infrastructure investments is not sufficient to guarantee that independent negotiations for
infrastructure and tariffs will reach the same solution as joint negotiations.  If negotiations are constructed
sequentially, then it is possible that countries will use their first round negotiations to influence their
23bargaining  position in the future  round. For example,  consider  the case in which  countries  choose
infrastructure  investments  in period 1, and then negotiate  tariff rates in period  2. This problem  would
arise if countries  cannot  commit  to future  tariff rates, so that any tariffs in period I would be renegotiated
in period 2.13  Assume  that lump sum  transfers between  the countries  are possible  and that the negotiation
process  can be modeled  using  the generalized  Nash bargaining  solution. The negotiated  tariff rates and
the lump  sum transfer  paid by country  A to country  B, TAB,  will be the solutions  to the problem
max  (W  A(tIlAt2A,v)  - T AB  W A(V))u  (W  B(tIAB  t 2BA,V)  + TAB -*  B(V))1 a-  (21)
AB,t AB, AB
where a e (0,1) reflects the relative bargaining power of country A and W '(v) is the threat point of
country i.  The threat point could be chosen to be the payoff in the "tariff war"(i.e. non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium) between the two countries, or it could be payoffs obtained under an existing trade
agreement.  The essential point for the argument here is that for either of these examples, the payoff in
the absence of the trade agreement will be affected by the infrastructure investment of country i.  Solving
the necessary conditions for (21) yields:
AB  ~AB  BA  ~BA
ti  =tl  t2 =t 2
(22)
AB(V) =  (1  a)(W  A(t  ABtBAV)  - A  (V))  - a(W B(Avl  I BA 
The use of the Nash bargaining solution with lump sum transfers ensures that the tariff rates will
maximize the sum member country welfare, WA  + WB,  so that the tariff rates chosen will be the efficient
ones defined in (20).  The transfer paid by country A is a decreasing function of its threat point and an
increasing function of B's threat point.
13 This sequence  of negotiations  is the natural  one because of the sunk nature of infrastructure
investments. Once made, these investments  are likely to be irreversible. In contrast,  tariff rates can be
changed  at relatively low cost.
24The present  value payoff  to country  A in period 1, given  tariff negotiations  in period  2
characterized  by (21), will be V A(j IAB2Ar  A,r  B)  - P3T  AB(()(r  A,r B)).  The benefit  to country  A of
infrastructure  investment  will thus be  -_  _  ,0  a  JT  A  . The first term is the net benefit from
8rA  13  A
infrastructure  investment  at given  tariffs as analyzed  in the previous section. The second  term is the
impact  of the investment  on the second  period negotiation  process. The tariff negotiation  process  will
T  AB
raise the benefits  of infrastructure  investment  to country  A iff  "  > 0. Utilizing  (22), this is more
likely to occur the greater  the benefits  of reduction  in v at the threat point  relative  to the agreement  for
country  A (i.e. larger  values  of  - 8(w  -W  A)  ),  and the greater  the benefits  of reduction  in v at the
agreement relative to the threat point for B  (larger values of -(W  a  )  . In the case considered by
McLaren  (1997)  where the tariff war is the threat point,  there is a presumption  that a small country  will
be harmed  in tariff negotiations  by infrastructure  investment. We can capture this case in the present
model (Case II of the previous section) by letting M 2B'_  --  and XIB'  -,  which yields  =O for i =  1,
a  w
2. All of the gains from infrastructure  accrue to the small country  under the agreement  ( i.e. aWB  =0
from (15)), but the small country  will not capture all of the gains from transport  cost reductions  in the
tariff war because  the large  country's  tariff is decreasing  in v. It can be shown  that increases  in the 1A
will raise TAB  when A is a small country,  so that A will underinvest  in infrastructure  relative  to the results
obtained in (3). '4
The present value payoff to country B in period 1 is V B(tABj  BA,r  A,r  B)  +  PT AB(+(r  A,r  B)).
Since  the only effect of the infrastructure  investment  on the tariff negotiation  process occurs  through
" 4Using  (14), it can be shown  that the optimal  tariff for country  i is t = Mi(p)/XJ,  which  yields t 4
=  0 and tB  > 0 when  A is small. Differentiating  with respect to v in the linear case and using  (13) yields
dt'/dv  = M'/(Xi!-2M')  and dtB/dv  =  - I/2. This result can be used to show that  - a(W  A -W  A) ) > 0 and
8v
- 8(WB0WB  Oso that  >O02
25changes in the transfer,  the tariff negotiation  process  raises the benefits  of infrastructure  to B iff it reduces
i3T AB the benefits  of infrastructure  to A (i.e.  < 0). This yields  the conclusion  that in the case where
infrastructure  levels  are chosen  non-cooperatively,  the tariff negotiation  process  will create an incentive
for the two countries  to alter their investment  levels in order to influence  the period  2 tariff negotiations.
Note however  that if the negotiation  process  creates an incentive  to increase  its investment,  it will also
create an incentive  for the other  country  to reduce its incentive.
The strategic  use of infrastructure  investments  to influence  tariff negotiations  by the two
countries  can be eliminated  if the countries  choose  to negotiate an infrastructure  agreement  in period 1. If
A and B negotiate  the level of infrastructure  investment  at time I and can make lump  sum transfers
between  the countries,  then the resulting  negotiation  process  will maximize  the sum of payoffs  to the two
countries, V  U  (t  ABtEA2r  A,r  B).  Comparing  with (20) for the case of simultaneous  tariff and
infrastructure  negotiations,  it can be seen that the outcome with sequential  negotiations  be  {I  A,?  B},  which
is the same  as in the simulatneous  negotiations. The existence  of negotiations  in period I allows  firms to
internalize  the effects of investments  on the future  negotiation  process and to obtain  efficient investment
levels.
V. Conclusions
This paper has shown  that the linkage  between  infrastructure  investments  and trade liberalization
depends critically  on the degree  of terms of trade spillovers  between  countries. The prediction  generated
by this model is that in the absence  of cooperative  agreements  between  countries,  there will be under
investment  in those forms  of transportation  in which the investments  have spillover  effects  to other
countries. This would  suggest,  for example,  that for a relatively small country  there should  be under
investment  in railroad  and highway  infrastructure  to neighboring  countries  relative  to airport and harbor
infrastructure. The former  types of investments  are specific  to certain  markets,  and are likely to have an
26impact  on the relative prices  of the goods  in those markets. The latter  type of investment,  on the other
hand, will send goods  to world markets  generally,  whose  prices  are likely to be relatively  unaffected  by
the investments. Two forms  of gains from infrastructure  agreements  have  also been identified. The first
is the role of these agreements  in internalizing  the terms  of trade effects  and thus avoiding  the inefficient
investment  levels  that arise in non-cooperative  choice of investment  levels. The second  is to internalize
the effects of the infrastructure  investment  on the tariff negotiation  process in cases where countries
cannot  commit to future  tariff rates.
The infrastructure  investments  analyzed  in this paper  can be compared  with other work  which has
analyzed  the role of coordination  of public goods  investments  within  a customs  union. The key feature  of
the transportation  infrastructure  investments  analyzed  in this paper is that the benefits of these
investments  is related  to the volume  of trade between  the two countries. The results of this paper might
then be applied to other  types of public goods  investments  whose  benefits  are tied to trade with a
particular  country. For example,  harmonization  of standards  or market rules that reduce the cost of
selling  goods in a particular  trading partner's  market would yield similar results.
The infrastructure  investments  analyzed  in this paper contrast  with public goods  analyzed  by
Clarida and Findlay  (1994) and Chiu (1997),  who consider  the case in which public goods investment
raise  the productivity  of all resources  within  a country. Clarida  and Findlay  (1994) obtain an
underinvestment  result when  public goods  investments  in one country  raise productivity  of resources in
the other country,  and analyze  how capital  mobility  within  the customs  union may create  a public
investment  boom. The underinvestment  result does not necessarily  arise in the case of transport
infrastructure  investments  because  the spillovers  between  countries  depend  on the pattern  of trade. Chiu
(1997) considers  the possibility  that public goods  investments  also affect non-member  countries,  and
examines  the incentives  to form  trading blocs which coordinate  investment  levels  when non-member
countries  can free ride on union public  goods investments. The analysis  in the current  paper  has
27abstracted  from spillover  effects of infrastructure  investments  on the rest of the world. The approach
taken in this paper  would suggest  that the spillovers  to outside  countries would  differ depending  on
whether investments  are general  transport  investments  that reduce costs with all trading  partners  or
investments  that are tied to costs of trading with a particular  partner.
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